

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.8

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 23 March 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. WACHUKU

(Nigeria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de SAN THIAGO DANTAS
Mr. de BELLO-FRANCO
Mr. C.A. BERNARDES
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LOUCANOV
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. V. PALINE
Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Burma:

U Thi HAN
Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. H. GREEN
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. G. IGNATIEFF

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. DAVID
Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. M. ZEMLA

Ethiopia:

Mr. K. YIFRU
Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. T. NEKASHA

India:

Mr. M.J. DESAI
Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. A. SEGNI
	Mr. C. RUSSO
	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. F. SENSI
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. M. TELLO
	Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
	Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. J. WACHUKU
	Mr. A.A. ATTA
	Mr. A. HAASTRUP
	Mr. V.N. CHIBUNDU
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. A. RAPACKI
	Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
	Mr. M. LACHS
	Mr. M. BIEN
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. C. MANESCU
	Mr. G. MACOVESCU
	Mr. C. SANDRU
	Mr. M. MALITZA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Baron C.H. von PLATEN
	Mr. G.A. WESTRING
	Mr. H. BLIX
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. A.A. GROMYKO
	Mr. V.A. ZORIN
	Mr. V.P. SUSLOV
	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M. FAWZI
Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. TALAAT
Mr. M.S. AHMED

United Kingdom:

The Earl of HOME
Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. D. RUSK
Mr. A. DEAN
Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. C.C. STELLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputies to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Mr. T.G. NARAYANAN
Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): The eighth meeting of the Conference is called to order. The first speaker on my list happens to be the Chairman for the day, myself, as representative of Nigeria.

I want to express my deep sense of appreciation that my country, the ninety-ninth Member of the United Nations, should have been elected to membership of this all-important Committee of the United Nations. Permit me also to take this opportunity of expressing my sincere appreciation of the following meaningful actions of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, representing the two great Power blocs. First I refer to the report (A/4879) which the two Powers presented to the United Nations stating their determination to renew negotiations on disarmament in an appropriate body within the United Nations. I attach great importance to this, because I think it is unique that two Power blocs should voluntarily submit themselves to an organization that in some quarters has been called bastardized. Secondly, I refer to the fact that these Powers negotiated and agreed upon certain principles to serve as a basis for renewed negotiations on disarmament.

I also attach great importance to this because to my knowledge it is the first time that the two great Powers have agreed on basic principles to guide them in the course of their negotiations. Again, when the Powers encountered a difficulty on the question of the composition of the body for the renewed negotiations, they did not hesitate to point this out to the United Nations, and there the present Committee was selected. A more significant aspect is that this is no longer a meeting of the two Power blocs alone. There have been injected into the negotiating body eight fledgling States, with no power, weak and, relatively speaking, more or less the babes of the family. In other words, the two great Powers are beginning to view greatness in an entirely different light. This is an inherent recognition that perhaps wisdom is not to be found only among the great. These gestures constitute, to my way of thinking, a great departure from previous disarmament conferences, which have ended in failure because of the rivalry between the Powers concerned.

My delegation further welcomes the willingness of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the Powers they represent, to facilitate the work of this Committee by submitting concrete proposals to serve as bases for negotiations within the agreed principles. Representatives will know what I mean.

(The Chairman, Nigeria)

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty on complete and general disarmament (ENDC/2), accompanied by an explanatory memorandum (ENDC/3). In addition, the Foreign Minister made a statement here (ENDC/PV.2, page 5). The Secretary of State of the United States presented proposals (ENDC/6), and he and the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom made statements here (ENDC/PV.2, page 15; PV.5, page 5). This morning, another draft document was distributed dealing with the banning of nuclear test explosions (ENDC/9). To me, as a newcomer, this augurs well for this Conference.

My delegation wishes to congratulate these two Governments and the Power systems they represent for this mutual co-operation, and we hope that it will continue throughout the period of negotiation. At this initial stage of our deliberations, my delegation is keeping an open mind, willing to listen and learn, to intervene when necessary, and at all times to be as constructive as possible.

To begin with, my delegation feels that we must create a certain minimum of confidence among all the participants from the very beginning. It is my considered opinion that the eight non-aligned Powers must develop confidence among themselves and establish and transmit that confidence and trust to the great Powers. If we succeed in doing this, we shall have found the key to and laid a sound foundation for the solution of the problems of disarmament. My delegation strongly believes that the eight non-aligned Powers in this Committee have a special and vital role to play in this Conference. The fact that the great Powers willingly accepted their participation in these negotiations is a measure of the trust and confidence they have that those eight Powers will be able to live up to their basic principles of non-alignment. It will be the duty of the eight non-aligned members of the Conference to hold religiously to the agreed principles in order to maintain a balance throughout the negotiations. It will be the duty of the eight non-aligned members at all times, whenever there seems to be any deviation from or sidetracking of the agreed principles, to call the attention of all concerned to return to these principles. In all such cases, this must be done fairly, firmly and cautiously, keeping ever in mind that the whole world is hoping and praying for the success of this Conference.

(The Chairman, Nigeria)

In the past several disarmament conferences have ended in failure. Some of the reasons for failure have been: (a) the unrepresentative nature of the machinery for negotiating disarmament questions, (b) the fact that, in the main, the Powers of these years tackled disarmament questions from a certain angle, namely, how to gain advantage over one's opponent, (c) the fact that in those early days wars were generally remote, except for the soldiers who fought them, and were considered to be great and ennobling ventures; that wars were waged for conquests and dominions, for plunder, for subjugation, and (d) the fact that weapons of war were less deadly than they are today.

Unlike other disarmament conferences in the past, the present Disarmament Conference possesses both in its composition and in its setting certain elements which, if their significance is fully appreciated, should lead the members of this Conference to persevere at all costs to achieve the objective which the United Nations has called upon them to attain.

For the first time the Disarmament Conference is composed of representatives from all corners of the world, representatives whose main vested interest is the preservation of the human race. The present Disarmament Conference is composed of representatives who are united in their common determination to abolish all forms of imperialism, domination and exploitation of man by man. This is clearly shown in the record in the United Nations of the Members that I see present here. To the members of this Conference, empires and dominions are things of the past. To them war is no longer a noble thing, war is no longer a remote, distant and isolated event, but a present danger which threatens the existence not only of individuals and peoples, but also of the whole world and the whole human race.

Disarmament becomes necessary and pressing because, if any war is precipitated, by mistake or by design, then civilization will be doomed to total annihilation; there will be no victor or vanquished, and no promise of a return to a better life for anyone. Knowing, therefore, that the consequences of any future war is total disaster to mankind in our world, we have the responsibility of devising a practical means to eradicate war and armaments from our world and our society.

As I have already said, the eight non-aligned nations members of this Disarmament Conference have had very grave responsibilities thrust on their

(The Chairman, Nigeria)

shoulders by the United Nations and by world public opinion. They are expected to intervene firmly and fearlessly in the interests of humanity, to break deadlocks whenever they occur between the great Powers, to serve as a steadying influence throughout the negotiations between the great Powers, and to be a solvent throughout the negotiations. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that if we hope to inspire confidence and trust between the two great Power blocs involved in these negotiations, no stone should be left unturned to remove as far as possible all those cold-war elements that have in the past poisoned the relationship between the two political and economic systems represented by the United States and the Western Powers, on the one hand, and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Warsaw Pact countries, on the other.

We must persuade the two Power blocs to accept the principle of co-existence not only in theory but also in practice. Our world today without the United States and the Western Powers would be the poorer; similarly, our world without the Soviet Union and the Eastern Powers which they represent would be the poorer. My delegation believes that the countries of Africa and other under-developed countries of the world have benefited by the existence of these two political and economic systems. We have learned a lot from them. We can still learn more from them.

Unless each of these systems harbours a secret desire to annihilate the other in order to dominate and exploit the rest of the world, there is no reason why they should not continue to co-exist. It is only in a secret desire such as I have mentioned that one can find a possible reason for a refusal to be amenable to reason and to the pleading of humanity to disarm in order to survive.

I am confident that every representative at this Conference is determined to play his or her full part to achieve general and complete disarmament. I am sure we are determined to make this joint enterprise in the interests of mankind and its civilization a resounding success.

I have not thought it necessary in these general and opening remarks to comment on the respective proposals put forward by the great Powers as a basis of discussion for an agreement, having regard to the agreed principles. There

(The Chairman, Nigeria)

will be ample time to deal with those proposals. However, as one of the three representatives of Africa at this Conference, I cannot fail to make clear the position of my delegation and my Government as regards nuclear explosions generally, and particularly as they affect Africa.

My delegation demands that every effort should be made to conclude an agreement to stop nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. The Lagos Conference of the African and Malagasy States, held from 25 to 30 January this year, adopted a resolution to this effect: Africa must be declared a nuclear-free zone. Any kind of nuclear explosion, whether in the atmosphere or underground, in Africa cannot be tolerated by my Government. My delegation and indeed my country, Nigeria, believe passionately in peace, and will work unrelentingly toward the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

Africa, the Continent of which I have the privilege of being a representative, believes in peace and in the peaceful settlement of disputes. African States passionately believe in peace and hold strongly to the view that only conditions of peace will enable them to consolidate their freedom and develop their material, moral and human resources. Consequently, they have made specific provision in the charter of the Organization of African and Malagasy States for the pacific settlement of disputes.

Before concluding these remarks, I would say the following. Perhaps this is the greatest assignment that humanity has given to politicians and rulers of men the world over. Scientists have been charged with responsibilities, and they have discharged them honourably. Engineers have been given their assignments, and they have accomplished them. Economists have also been assigned their own responsibilities, and they have carried them out. In the past, politicians have been given assignments in the international field, and they have failed. Humanity has now entrusted us with the heavy responsibility of resolving the problem of general and complete disarmament. In order to discharge this obligation honourably and well, we must forgo the desire to score points over one another and the desire to make propaganda. We must now bring into play in the international sphere those moral and other qualities which have made politicians so successful in handling their national problems. This responsibility devolves more on the eight non-aligned members of the Committee. We must not fail mankind.

(The Chairman, Nigeria)

As Chairman, before calling on the next speaker I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to document ENDC/10 containing an interim report of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests which was established by this Committee.

Mr. RUSK (United States of America): I have asked for the floor this morning to comment on the interim report to which the Chairman has just alluded. I do so because of the expressed wishes of a considerable number of Foreign Ministers to turn their attention urgently to this problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests before the Foreign Ministers begin to return to their respective capitals.

Let me say that the United States deeply regrets, in the words of the brief interim report, that it is not possible to report progress towards a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. The United States regards and will continue to regard a safeguarded end to nuclear testing as a major objective of its foreign policy. It also regards this as a major problem for consideration by this Conference.

The reason is obvious. The moratorium which for almost three years had halted nuclear weapon tests was wrecked by the sudden resumption of testing by the Soviet Union last September. The President of the United States has announced that the United States will resume testing in the atmosphere late in April, if by that time a safeguarded test ban treaty has not been signed. The reasons for this decision were set forth in his speech of 2 March, which we are asking be circulated as a document of this Conference^{1/}. The time is short; and this Conference will understandably wish to be sure that every possible effort is made to prevent a further intensification of the race to produce more and more deadly weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, that interim report indicates that no progress has been made towards the conclusion of an effective treaty to prohibit nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union appears to be adamantly opposed to any international system of detection and verification which could disclose clandestine testing and thus serve to place an obstacle in the way of a potential violator of a test ban treaty.

^{1/} ENDC/13

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

We hope we have not yet heard the last word of the Soviet Union on this matter, though I must confess that we see little ground for optimism at the moment.

Because of the United States Government's great desire to put an end to all tests of nuclear weapons, we are willing to sign a safeguarded treaty, with effective international controls, even though the Soviet Union conducted over forty tests last fall. However, we are willing to ignore these tests only if in return we can be assured that testing will actually be halted. We will not again make our security subject to an unenforceable and uncontrolled moratorium, whether this be in the form of a verbal pledge or a pseudo-treaty such as the USSR proposed on 23 November 1961 (GEN/DNT/122).

What we need above all in this field is confidence and not fear, a basis for trust and not for suspicion. To get this is the major purpose of our insistence on effective international arrangements to ensure that nuclear weapon tests, once outlawed, do not in fact ever occur again.

You will remember that the atmosphere for agreements on disarmament questions was not too favourable in 1958, especially after the collapse of lengthy negotiations in London during much of 1957. Accordingly, in the search for a more promising approach to the issue of a nuclear test ban, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union decided to try to resolve the technical questions first before proceeding to a consideration of political questions. This path led to a conference in Geneva in July and August 1958 among the scientists of eight countries, that is, of the three then existing nuclear Powers plus France, Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.

On 20 August 1958 these experts unanimously agreed on the details of a control system which would be technically adequate to monitor a treaty ending all tests of nuclear weapons (EXP/NUC/28). Before 1 September 1958 the recommendations of the scientists had been accepted in toto by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Essentially these same technical provisions formed the basis of the draft test ban treaty presented by the United States and the United Kingdom on 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9).

I believe it would be helpful to review some of the technical aspects of controlling a test ban.

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

The words "detection" and "identification" are the key to an understanding of the technical aspects of verification. A great many methods have been devised by scientists to record the innumerable happenings of a geophysical nature which take place around us. Earthquakes are registered by seismographs; hydro-acoustic apparatus records sounds in the oceans. I have mentioned these two particular types of instruments because they, along with various other devices, also happen to be capable of registering signals which are emitted by nuclear detonations. What we call detection is merely the capturing of these diverse signals.

Detection, however, is only half the story; in fact it is rather less than half. The primary concern is to know exactly what has been recorded or detected. For example, the signal received on a seismograph from an underground nuclear explosion looks like the signals received on a seismograph from many types of earthquakes. Signals which may come from a small nuclear detonation in the atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In each case, the overwhelming difficulty confronting any control system monitoring a nuclear test ban is how to differentiate among the various recordings or detected signals, how to tell which is a natural phenomenon and which is a nuclear explosion.

This was exactly the issue that faced the scientists in Geneva in mid-1958. It is the very same issue that faces us on control today. The answer of the scientists was that where doubt existed the only way to clear up the mystery was to utilize some form of on-site inspection. This is still the only answer available to us.

In regard to underground tests, except for quite large ones like the Soviet blast of 2 February 1962, the technical situation is unchallenged by anybody and was even readily admitted by the Soviet Government on 28 November last when it put forward its new test ban scheme based on existing monitoring systems. For these underground events which are detected but which cannot be identified by expert interpretation of the seismic recording, the only way to determine what has happened is to send an investigating team to the spot. The events could be earthquakes or secret nuclear tests. And there could be some hundreds of such events per year in the United States and in the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

There is no scientific method not involving inspection that can identify positively a seismic event as a nuclear explosion. If our Soviet colleagues have reason to believe otherwise, they should come forward with their new scientific evidence.

This technical situation provides a further important reason for including the Soviet Union in the world-wide control post network. The spacing between the control posts in the Soviet Union should be exactly the same as it is in the rest of the world. In order to have the best chance to eliminate a seismic event from suspicion without conducting an inspection, that is, by means of the interpretation of the seismic recording itself by experts, it is essential to have readings from control posts on a global basis, including those within the United States and the USSR. Without instruments in the USSR, one-sixth of the land mass of the globe, many more seismic events in that country become suspicious.

In connexion with atmospheric tests the conclusive means for identifying the true nature of a detected event is to acquire a sample of the air near that event. If the event was man-made, this will show up during a chemical analysis of the air sample. For medium and large atmospheric nuclear detonations the radioactive debris will become part of air masses that are certain to move beyond the boundaries of the country concerned. This method is not reliable, however, for small atmospheric tests.

In recognition of this the 1958 scientists recommended the installation of air sampling equipment at every control post. Even then, they anticipated that in certain instances some question of identification would still remain, and for this they proposed the use of special aircraft flights conducted over the territory of a specific country to capture air samples. Naturally, to the extent that control posts within a country did not exist where radioactive air sampling could take place, there would be just that much greater need of special air sampling flights.

Although American scientists have for the past several years been actively seeking new methods of detection and, even more, of identification of possible nuclear explosions, and although there are some promising avenues of investigation which may be proven in the next few years, the fact is that very little has been

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

discovered up to date to justify any significant modification of the conclusions and recommendations of the Geneva scientists of 1958. Soviet scientists essentially agreed with this at our last joint meeting with them on a test ban during May 1960 in Geneva. Therefore, when we contemplate the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by international agreement, we must still look to international control arrangements similar to those proposed in 1958 to give the world security against violations. But the faster we have tried to move toward the Soviets in these matters, the faster they seem to move away from their earlier positions.

The draft treaty which the United States and the United Kingdom proposed in April 1961 (ENDC/9) reflected the recommendations of the 1958 experts. It also incorporated into its terms a large number of political and organizational arrangements for the test ban control organization on which the three Powers had already come to agreement at the test ban Conference or which went far towards meeting previous Soviet demands. Eastern and Western nations were to have equal numbers of seats on the control commission, which also had places for non-aligned nations, and there were detailed provisions for an equitable division by nationality of the international staff, as the USSR had sought. The fact that many of the administrative and organizational provisions for the future international disarmament organization, as set forth in the Soviet document tabled here on 15 March (ENDC/2), are similar to the provisions of the United States-United Kingdom draft test ban treaty of last year demonstrates that the Soviet Union can have no serious objection to large portions of our proposal.

Indeed, when all is said and done, the fundamental Soviet complaint about the test ban control system to which it seemed to agree in 1958, 1959 and 1960, and which its own scientists had helped to devise, is that it would facilitate Western espionage against the Soviet Union. But the facts are otherwise. The proposed system would not have any potential for any espionage which would be meaningful in terms of present-day military requirements.

The truth is that under the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty, control posts in the USSR would be immobile units with fixed boundaries. No site could be chosen for a control post in the USSR without the specific consent of the Soviet Government. No foreign personnel on the staff of any control post would have any official need to leave the boundaries of the post -- except

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

when entering and leaving Soviet territory -- and it would be up to the Soviet authorities to decide whether such personnel should be permitted to leave the post. Within the post one-third of the technical staff and all of the auxiliary staff would be Soviet nationals, nominated by the Soviet Government. In these circumstances, surely nothing taking place within the post could remain unknown to the Soviet Government.

The situation concerning on-site inspection teams would be equally devoid of espionage possibilities. The area to be inspected would be predetermined on the basis of seismographic recordings. There would be no random selection of the geographic site. To get to the site of the inspection the teams would have to use transport furnished by the Soviet Government. They could carry only specified equipment related to their immediate task. Although no Soviet nationals would be members of the inspection team, half of the team would be nationals of non-aligned countries, and the Soviet Government would be invited to assign as many Soviet observers as it wished to verify the activities of the inspection team.

I should also stress that the size of the inspectable area would in any event be limited to the territory within a radius of about eight or, in some cases, thirteen kilometres from the point, the so-called probable epicentre, where the unidentified seismic event was presumed to have taken place. This radius would involve an inspectable area of 200 or, in some cases, 500 square kilometres. The Soviet Union has territory of over 21 million square kilometres. Therefore it can readily be seen that even if there were twenty inspections per year in the USSR, and even if each of these inspections operated within a 500 square kilometre area, less than one-twentieth of one per cent of Soviet territory that is, less than one part in 2,000, could ever be subject to inspection in any one year.

Finally, no espionage would be feasible on the occasional special air sampling flights which might take place over Soviet territory. The plane and its crew would be Soviet, and Soviet Government observers could be on board. The only foreigners would be two staff technicians from the control organization who would manage the equipment taking the air samples and who would ensure that the plane actually flew along the route previously prescribed.

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

I have recounted these matters in some detail because it is easy to make generalized charges over and over again about the dangers of espionage in a test ban control system. It takes careful explanation to show why such charges are completely groundless, even though it stands to reason that the USSR, which was just as sensitive about espionage in 1958 as in 1961, would never have accepted such a control system in principle in 1958 if it had then believed that the system could have had the slightest real espionage danger for the Soviet Union.

It should be clear now that the explanation of Soviet behaviour on the issue of a test ban must be sought elsewhere. There is no rational basis for Soviet concern about misuse of the control system for espionage purposes. There is no scientific basis for the Soviet desire to abandon the still indispensable control system which was recommended by the scientists in 1958 and approved by the Governments of the then existing nuclear Powers. There is no political basis for any of us to believe that a test ban is any less urgent now than it was in 1958 or that the benefits which it would bring in improving the international climate would be any less.

My Government is therefore at a loss to understand the Soviet position unless it be that the USSR has decided that it is still overwhelmingly important for it to be free to continue its nuclear weapon tests. This was what the Soviet Government said last September, when it referred to the tense international situation as a justification for its test resumption, and it may be that the USSR feels a military need for another test series. If this is the case, then it is true that the easiest way for the Soviet Union to remain unhampered by a test ban treaty is to offer one which contains no provisions whatsoever for effective control and which the United States and United Kingdom could accept only at grave risk to their national security and to that of the free world.

I cannot urge the Soviet Government too strongly to review its position and to return to the previously agreed basis of negotiation, namely, the experts' recommendation of 1958. We ask the Soviet Union to cease its attempts to have the international community distort sound verification procedures to accommodate one State which is obsessed by a passion for secrecy. We call upon the Soviet Union to enter into genuine negotiations in the three nation Sub-Committee set up by this Committee to consider the test ban problem.

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

There is today an interim report of this Sub-Committee (ENDC/10) but, unfortunately, there are no grounds for encouragement. I should like to comment briefly on the events of the past few weeks which have led us to this point.

The President of the United States, on 2 March, stated in referring to our Conference here, that:

"... we shall, in association with the United Kingdom, present once again our proposals for a separate comprehensive treaty ... with appropriate arrangements for detection and verification -- to halt permanently the testing of all nuclear weapons, in every environment; in the air, in outer space, underground or under water. New modifications will also be offered" he said, "in the light of new experience." (ENDC/13, page 9)

In fulfilment of this pledge the United States presented to the Soviet Union, first in an informal meeting on 15 March, and this week in the Sub-Committee, new proposals of the kind indicated. We have indicated clearly in both formal and informal discussions that the United States is prepared to grant a point to which the Soviet Union has apparently attached great importance, namely, to drop the 4.75 degree threshold and to make the treaty, from the outset, complete in its coverage -- banning from the beginning all tests in the atmosphere, outer space, underground and in the oceans. We will do this without increasing the number of inspections or the number of control posts in the Soviet Union. We would seek, by common agreement, to allocate the quota of inspections in such a way that most would be conducted in a few areas of high seismicity and only a few would be allowable in a large region in the heart of the Soviet Union where there are normally few seismic noises which would require investigation.

These moves have been made possible by increased experience and increased scientific knowledge. But our experience has also shown the need for provisions for safeguarding other States against the consequences of preparations for testing. These would consist in large part of periodic declarations on the part of heads of States that there would be no preparations for testing, and agreed rights to inspect a certain number of times per year equal numbers of declared sites on each side.

Experience has also shown the need for provisions to shorten the time spent before the beginning of the inspection process. This would primarily be a question of the way the preparatory commission functioned, and agreement to

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

co-operate in speeding up by all possible means the establishment of detection facilities, including temporary control posts.

The United States has made clear that it still stands by its original treaty proposal of 18 April 1961 plus the amendments proposed in 1961 (ENDC/9) and will sign that treaty. It has also made clear that it is willing to negotiate along the lines I have described to up-date the treaty if the Soviet Union prefers.

The response of the Soviet Union thus far has not given us any hope. The Soviet delegation has told us that the USSR will not accept a treaty with or without the amendments we propose. We are still confronted with the unmistakable reversal of the Soviet position which took place a few months ago after the Soviet Union had for four years asserted its willingness to accept a controlled test ban agreement, and after seventeen articles and two important treaty annexes had been negotiated. The roadblock to a cessation of tests is this reversal of the Soviet attitude. The USSR was prepared to accept controls before the recent test series; now, after forty or more tests, it is not ready to do so. It is difficult for us to understand the reason.

The problem cannot really be espionage. As I have outlined in detail, for over two years in the test ban Conference we negotiated arrangements which would ensure that the modest amount of control and inspection contemplated could not be misused for espionage purposes.

Nor can the problem be that the verification system is unduly burdensome. As I have said, the system which we worked out was directly based on the estimate of the minimum technical requirements which was the product of an agreed analysis by Soviet and Western scientists. The technical basis for this system has never yet been challenged on scientific grounds by the Soviet Union.

The USSR now seems to be telling us that under existing circumstances the idea of international verification in any form whatsoever is wholly unacceptable; it seems to be telling us that verification is not even necessary, that it is an insult to request it, even though this is a measure of disarmament. Unnecessary? Merely necessary to end nuclear testing. It seems to be telling us that there can be no impartial investigation, even when there has been a signal recorded from within the Soviet Union and when it is impossible, without such an investigation, to ascertain whether the cause of the signal was a phenomenon of nature or a man-made nuclear explosion.

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

We recognize that there are risks in any disarmament measure because no control system can give one hundred per cent certainty, but a study of our draft treaty with our proposed modifications will indicate that the United States and the United Kingdom have been willing to accept a very considerable degree of risk. However, we cannot move towards a treaty which is based on no adequate controls at all, but solely on pure faith. We do not ask the Soviet Union to trust the word of other nations, and other nations cannot be asked to trust the Soviet Union's word on matters of such far-reaching significance.

In President Kennedy's words of 2 March:

".... we know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium." (ENDC/13, page 10)

The same could equally be said about an unverified treaty obligation such as the USSR is now proposing. We do not intend to be caught again as we were in the autumn of 1961, and there is no reason why we should have to be caught again, by a unilateral Soviet decision to resume nuclear weapon tests. This is a risk to national and international security which the United States cannot and will not take. A test ban, or any disarmament measure, will be acceptable to us only when it is accompanied by adequate measures of verification.

In summary, the essential element on which we must insist is that there be an objective international system for assuring that the ban against testing is being complied with. This means that there must be an international system for distinguishing between natural and artificial events. The 18 April treaty provided for such a system. Last week the United States and the United Kingdom made some modifications of the proposed treaty in a way calculated to meet Soviet objections. These proposed modifications were rejected almost immediately by the Soviet Union on the ground that international verification was not necessary. This refusal to accept any form of verification strikes very hard at our efforts to guarantee the world against the resumption of nuclear tests. The key element in the United States position is that there must be effective international verification of the obligations undertaken in any such treaty.

(Mr. Rusk, United States)

Let there be no misunderstanding in this Committee. A nuclear test ban agreement can be signed in short order. There are no hidden difficulties; there are no mysterious obstacles in the way; no time-consuming negotiations need be required. The groundwork has all been laid. Only one element is missing -- Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement.

The United States will consider any proposal which offers effective international verification, but the United States cannot settle for anything less.

We urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its attitude and join in putting an end to nuclear weapon testing -- a total end, a permanent end.

Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We too very much regret that the group composed of the representatives of the three Powers, after its meetings to discuss the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, has been unable to reach agreement. This is a lamentable fact, and it shows that no progress is being made on the subject. The Soviet Government made considerable efforts to come to an understanding with our Western partners in regard to the signing of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

But what is to be done, if those with whom we conduct negotiations counted from the very beginning on the breakdown of these negotiations? What government that was striving for disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests could announce, a few days before the start of the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee, its decision to resume tests of these weapons? No government that was really striving for disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests could act in such a way, since such a decision would be in defiance of the whole world, of all States that are in favour of disarmament. That is precisely how the United States Government has acted.

Consequently, the Eighteen Nation Committee will soon be carrying on its work to the accompaniment of nuclear bomb explosions conducted by the Government of the United States of America. And in these circumstances the official representatives of the United States Government, including the United States Secretary of State, are trying to persuade us that the United States Government is in favour of disarmament and of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Gromyko, USSR)

The decision taken by the United States Government, especially since it was taken on the eve of the commencement of the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee, is an aggressive act, which, apparently, is also intended to complicate the conditions in the Committee, where, in our opinion, serious attempts must be made to reach agreement on general questions of disarmament and in particular on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

Statements are sometimes made to the effect that the Soviet Union, allegedly, violated some sort of moratorium towards the end of last year, when it conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests. But what violation of a moratorium is in question here? And what moratorium in general is in question? All of us know quite well -- and so does the United States Government -- that no moratorium existed, there was no agreement on a moratorium.

Moreover, the United States Government openly announced before the resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the Soviet Union that the United States was keeping its hands free in regard to the resumption of testing. It may be objected that it was the Eisenhower Government that made this announcement. Yes, it was the Eisenhower Government that made this announcement, but no announcement in a different sense has been made by the new United States Government. Consequently, there are no grounds for asserting that the Soviet Union violated something by resuming nuclear weapon tests in the autumn of last year.

Furthermore, it is well known that the story did not begin six months ago. It is well known that each time the Soviet Government had recourse to a resumption of nuclear weapon tests -- I stress the point -- each time it was merely replying to corresponding actions by the Western Powers and, above all, by the government of the United States of America.

Let us consider who was the first to test nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, perhaps? I think it is an elementary truth that it was the United States that started testing nuclear weapons and, as is well known, not only testing them. There is consequently no justification for levelling reproaches at the Soviet Union on this score, since our resumption of nuclear weapon tests last autumn must be regarded as a reply to the corresponding actions of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Further, everybody also knows quite well that the Western Powers have carried out far more nuclear explosions than the Soviet Union. Perhaps some people are inclined to discount this fact. But try to look at the situation with the eyes of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Gromyko, USSR)

How would any government act that was concerned about its security in the circumstances that have arisen, especially when the Western Powers are openly rattling their sabres and threatening the Soviet Union? In such a situation it would draw the same conclusion as the Soviet Union did and would carry out tests. And that is how we acted.

What then is the reason for the absence of agreement? Why was the group, which recently resumed its work in order to consider the question of the possibility of reaching agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, unable to reach agreement? It was unable to reach agreement because the United States of America and its NATO allies put forward as an indispensable condition for the signing of an international treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests a demand for the establishment of a system of international intelligence, of international espionage in the territory of the Soviet Union and certain other States.

This group was unable to reach agreement because the United States of America and its NATO allies put forward as an indispensable condition for the signing of an international treaty on the discontinuance of tests this demand for the establishment of a system of international espionage. They call this control, allegedly dictated by the need to supervise compliance with an appropriate international treaty. But if they were speaking the truth, they would call it by its proper name.

When the representatives of the United States Government pose the question as to what harm would be done by the establishment of such an international system in the appropriate countries, including the territory of the Soviet Union, they are obviously pretending to be unaware of the aims pursued by the originators of this demand. They are, however, well aware of what the demand for the establishment of such a system is aimed at. Particularly well aware of this are the United States generals, who make statements almost daily, each one more flippant and irresponsible than the last. They are constantly asserting that their target is such and such a Soviet objective, such and such an area of the Soviet Union. Judge for yourselves what conclusion the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are bound to draw from this fact in the light of these demands for so-called international control. The term "international control" should be put in inverted commas, because in reality there is nothing "international" about this idea, much less about the operations that would be involved. It simply refers to the establishment of espionage centres by the Powers playing first fiddle in the NATO military bloc.

(Mr. Gromyko, USSR)

We have stated, and I want to state again here, that there is every possibility of ensuring proper control, proper observation over compliance, and, moreover, strict compliance with an international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. Science and technology have now attained such a level that there is no difficulty in recording any explosions of nuclear weapons and establishing whether they were explosions of nuclear weapons or -- as Mr. Rusk has said here -- natural events.

Of course, someone may say that he is not altogether familiar with the latest achievements of science and technology in this field. We concede that this may be so. Science and technology in this field, the production and manufacture of appropriate instruments, have not reached a uniform level in all countries. But the Western Powers, which are trying to criticize the Soviet Union for its position on this question, are well aware of the real situation. They know quite well that we know it; they also know quite well that we know what the situation is in reality. Nevertheless, they go on asserting day after day that the achievements of science do not at present make it possible to distinguish nuclear weapon explosions from natural events.

As we know, science is the same everywhere and the laws of nature are one and the same. We cannot concede that these laws of nature are more favourable to the Soviet Union than to the United States. Nor can we concede that the United States is incapable of possessing and producing instruments of the same quality as the Soviet Union for recording nuclear explosions. What of the much-vaunted technology of the United States?

We are quite sure and we know that the United States possesses excellent equipment which is as capable of recording nuclear explosions as our own. So the position is that we have the same science and the same laws of nature in operation, but two policies. One policy in this matter is the one being pursued by the Soviet Union, which is honestly pressing for the immediate conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. The other policy is the one being pursued by the United States, the United Kingdom and certain others of their NATO allies. They are doing everything possible to prevent the signing of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Gromyko, USSR)

Those who try to criticize us sometimes raise the question of the possibility of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests being violated. We hold, and the Soviet Government is convinced of this, that if the States -- and at present a limited group of States is involved -- if the States which solemnly put their signatures to a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests adopt a fully responsible attitude towards compliance with this undertaking, there will be no reason to doubt that a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests will be observed.

I can say with complete authority that so far as the Soviet Government is concerned, if it signs a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, it will strictly comply with that treaty. If the Western Powers also approach their obligations with regard to the discontinuance of tests honestly, there will be no danger of the violation of this treaty or of any relevant international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

In trying to reassure us that we need not fear the establishment of an international system of control in the territory of the Soviet Union, they tell us:

"Well, we Western Powers will come to you, we will send our controllers and inspectors into the territory of the Soviet Union, while you, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, will send your inspectors and controllers into the territory of the United States, the United Kingdom and certain other States."

But we have no desire to establish our system of control posts or, in other words, our intelligence posts in the territory of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries. We have no such desire. The proposal for this questionable deal does not, therefore, attract us.

Apart from anything else, if a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests were signed, its observance would involve the honour of States. Let us imagine that there was a country whose government committed a violation of the treaty. That government would be discredited as a violator of an international agreement.

Moreover, why do the Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers -- I am referring to the nuclear Powers -- omit all mention of one very crucial fact, namely, that

(Mr. Gromyko, USSR)

there is another nuclear Power, France, which has started to produce nuclear weapons but which is not present at this table? Yet this Power is an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom. Surely we must take this fact into account?

The Soviet Government has already stated that an international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is possible only if it is signed by the Governments of all the nuclear Powers. No agreement is possible unless it is signed by the Governments of all these Powers.

In replying to our statements to this effect, an attempt is sometimes made to give the impression that everything is not going smoothly among the Western Powers where nuclear weapons and armaments production are concerned, that there are certain disagreements within the Western group of nuclear Powers.

But you must agree that this is a family affair of these Powers. We in the Soviet Union consider that, as nuclear Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and France are members of the same family -- the NATO military bloc. Accordingly, the only correct conclusion, and the one to which the Soviet Government has in fact come, is that an international agreement can be signed only if the obligations for which it provides are assumed by all the nuclear Powers, and not by three-quarters of these Powers.

A fundamental question arises: what really accounts for the fact that there is no agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests? What accounts for the fact that the United States and certain of its allies are pursuing an obstructionist policy in this matter of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests?

The Soviet Government has given much thought to this matter and has made a detailed study of the situation. It has come to the conclusion -- and we believe the same conclusion has been reached by others -- that the United States Government apparently considers that the continuance of nuclear weapon testing by itself and its allies will bring certain additional benefits or advantages to the Western Powers. These Governments have, it seems, come to the conclusion that the continuation of the competition or, in other words, the race in the matter of nuclear weapon testing will give them certain advantages over the

(Mr. Gromyko, USSR)

Soviet Union. But we have given the Governments of the Western Powers an answer on this point, an answer which we give now in the words of Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, the Head of our Government:

"Competition in this field, as in others, is still competition. One may win or one may lose."

In connexion with nuclear weapon testing, the United States sometimes asserts that it must either catch up with or overtake the Soviet Union in the production of nuclear weapons. But, as in any competition, while there is a possibility of taking the lead, there is also a possibility of lagging behind the person one is trying to overtake and considerably further behind than at the present time. There is thus room for miscalculation here. This fact, too, should therefore have been taken into account by our partners in the negotiations on the disarmament problem and, in particular, in the negotiations on nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet Government sincerely hopes that the Government of the United States and the Governments of the other nuclear Western Powers will reconsider their position, that they will adopt a more realistic attitude to the situation, will renounce the race in regard to nuclear weapon tests and will agree to sign an appropriate international treaty on the prohibition of tests. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, I think it necessary to reiterate that the Soviet Government is prepared to sign an international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests this very day.

We are sure that not only the Soviet people, but also other peoples, including the American, British and French people, the peoples of other European countries and of Asian and African countries, will breathe more freely than at present if an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is signed.

We make a particular appeal in this connexion to the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, whose responsible representatives are sitting at this table.

I have a few general comments on the situation which has developed in the Eighteen Nation Committee during the first stage of its work. I do not propose to embark on a detailed analysis of this situation, since I do not believe this to be my task. I would, however, like to express the following view on behalf of the Soviet delegation.

(Mr. Gromyko, USSR)

The start of our Committee's work is unfortunately not encouraging either in regard to consideration of the question of concluding an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests or in regard to the settlement of other disarmament questions. Say what you will, an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests -- even if one were successfully concluded -- still does not constitute disarmament. The signing of such an agreement would not mean that the world would be rid of a single atomic bomb. More than that, not only would the world not be rid of a single bomb, but the stockpiling of nuclear weapons would continue and the scale of production in this field is now quite substantial. This fact alone points to the need for serious efforts to find a solution to the problem of disarmament as a whole, including the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of these weapons and their final prohibition, together with the liquidation of other types of weapons and the dismantling of the entire military machine of States. The views expressed during this initial stage of the Committee's work, when we heard the major statements by the Foreign Ministers on the disarmament policy of their Governments, cause us to doubt whether all the States represented here are striving for disarmament.

But let us not look too far ahead. I merely wished frankly to express the doubt that has arisen in our mind. We appeal to all participants, to all the Governments represented in this Committee, to make an effort, with all seriousness and in the awareness of the great responsibility that rests with the States concerned, to take a resolute step forward and to reach agreement on the problem of general and complete disarmament, thus eliminating the threat of a new war once and for all.

Lord HOME (United Kingdom): The Committee has heard a very important analysis by the Secretary of State of the United States on the subject of verification. I think we shall all want to study it with great care.

We have had a reply from the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, a reply in which I detected every now and again a certain element of recrimination. He said, for instance, that it was an intolerable thought that the President of the United States, should say, on the eve of this Conference, that unless a test ban could be agreed the United States and the United Kingdom would have to resume testing.

(Lord Home, United Kingdom)

Our memories may not be very long, but they are long enough to remember a conference at Belgrade in the autumn of last year and a series of tests by the Soviet Union just before the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am not admitting that there is any comparison at all between what Mr. Gromyko has referred to and the action of the President of the United States. Mr. Gromyko is very fond of quoting Russian proverbs to us. I shall tell him that in the United Kingdom we have a proverb which says that there is very little profit in the pot calling the kettle black. Perhaps for the moment we might leave it at that.

He also said that United States generals made statements naming targets in the Soviet Union, and that that caused the Soviet Union great apprehension. He said that those statements were often unconsidered and reckless. It is not my business to defend United States generals, but I remember a statement being made by somebody that the United Kingdom could be sunk like an aircraft carrier and there would be no trace of us left. Was that statement considered and responsible?

Then he asked again: how would any government proceed if another government was rattling its swords and making other people apprehensive? Well, I shall tell him. They would welcome a proposal to abolish the swords and to turn them into ploughshares as quickly as it could be done. And that, I understand it, is the purpose of our meeting here.

Although the Sub-Committee has so far reported no progress, I want to make a little postscript to what Mr. Rusk has said, because I do not think that we can accept the present position and I do not think that we need to. I want to remind this Committee that almost all the ingredients of a test ban treaty are written down on paper and could be agreed, if we had the will to do so, in a week. I think it would be a good thing if we all refreshed our memory about that piece of paper, which writes down the articles of a test ban treaty -- all except a very, very few points of disagreement. I want to say one or two things about that while there is still time.

There are some treaties, for instance non-aggression pacts, which, if they are broken, are broken openly. The difference between a disarmament treaty and treaties such as a nuclear test ban is that they can be broken secretly. Therefore, the question before the Committee is: What is the minimum verification needed to provide an adequate safeguard?

(Lord Home, United Kingdom)

Mr. Rusk spoke to us this morning about detection and location, and it is quite clear to the Committee that there is a genuine difficulty in distinguishing between a nuclear explosion and an earthquake. Our scientific advice is the same as that of the United States, namely, that our instruments are not yet accurate enough to fulfil all these functions and to distinguish between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion. Mr. Gromyko's instruments may be better. We do not know what he knows, but if he knows, let him tell us what he knows so that we may also know. Several times we have asked the Soviet Union whether in this respect, they would allow our scientists to talk with theirs on this subject. The Soviet Union has always refused this request. I renew it now. Will Mr. Gromyko allow the Soviet scientists to talk with our scientists and to come to a common agreement about these matters? I hope he will say "Yes", because this would be a constructive thing to do and we might come to a common agreement upon it.

Then again, in the field of general disarmament there has never been an agreement between East and West on what amount of verification should be employed to satisfy us all. But as Mr. Rusk has reminded us, in the field of nuclear tests there has been an agreement. It was signed not so very long ago by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, France, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. Their scientists drew up a plan on which all of us agreed -- eight of the countries members of the Committee. There were two recommendations in that plan: one that there should be an international detection system and the other that there should be an international system of inspection and control. That was agreed by all the scientists of those countries sitting round this table and it was accepted and agreed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. There is a treaty in existence, there is a proposal in existence, to which we have all put our names.

Mr. Gromyko said that we ought to call a spade a spade. I am all for it. But the Soviet Government did not at that time say one word about espionage. I suggest that each of us should look at this treaty very seriously. If we possibly can, we should get back to it, because this was a very remarkable achievement. The scientists of eight countries, including East and West, all agreed on a project, and it was accepted by the Governments of the three nuclear Powers.

(Lord Home, United Kingdom)

One of the chief remaining disputes, as lately as September of last year, let us remember, was about the number of control posts -- we said we wanted twenty in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union said, I think, it wanted fifteen -- and the number of people at each post. Why has all this good work been thrown overboard, and why can we not ressurect it and get back to work on it again? For that is a practical plan. The answer, of course, which Mr. Gromyko gives is that the world situation has changed for the worse. But even if we admit that it has, is it not all the more necessary to get down really to signing a treaty? I would make an appeal that we should do that.

There is one other matter which is really worth pinpointing because I think there is a good deal of misunderstanding about what is the purpose of inspection of unexplained events. It is not to put the Soviet Union into the dock. It is not to put the United States or the United Kingdom into the dock. It is specifically designed to clear the Soviet Union or to clear the United States or the United Kingdom if charges are made that we are testing when we are not. That is the purpose of verification. When a suspicion arises that tests have been made, we want someone who is qualified to be able to come and say, "That was not a secret test; it was an earthquake." That is the sole purpose of verification: to make sure that a country is not unjustly accused and to give confidence to the world when an accusation is in danger of being made. As far as I know -- and I do appeal to Mr. Gromyko on this -- the Soviet Union is now the only country in the world which will not gladly offer that service to humanity. I do beg him, therefore, to think again.

Now, Mr. Gromyko says that there will be no dispute; that if there is an explosion, it will be a fact, it will be known to everybody and apparent to everybody, and there will be no dispute about facts. But there are constant disputes about facts. The Chinese are on Indian soil, but the Chinese deny it. Only ten days ago I had to tell Mr. Gromyko that the Berlin air corridors were full of metal chaff dropped from aeroplanes; he denied it absolutely. Now, this is a fact that somebody ought to go and decide upon, to say whether I am a liar or he is mistaken. Somebody impartial really ought to go and look in these cases and say "yes" or "no".

(Lord Home, United Kingdom)

We do not want espionage in the Soviet Union. We do not want anybody to go and spy. I cannot believe that Mr. Gromyko is really saying that unaligned States, some of them sitting around this table, are necessarily spies and necessarily not impartial. What a doctrine to put before us! It is inconceivable to me that that position could be held. Therefore I beg him again to think whether he cannot -- and he did not turn it down today, which gave me a glimmer of hope -- even now turn back to look at a really sensible, practical scheme of verification. He says that he does not want other countries to take the word of the Soviet Union, but who then will he allow to pronounce upon the data which he chooses to give to the world? I hope he will tell us. He might also consider this point: if, as he asserts, there are going to be no tests in the Soviet Union in any circumstances, what on earth has he to fear from a minimal system of inspection? The inspectors will simply sit there and do nothing, if there are no tests.

I am profoundly unhappy that there has been no progress, but I feel that we must not allow this situation to continue and that we should make more efforts -- and be assisted by others in this, if necessary -- to find an agreement. I repeat -- and I know this is true of the United States too -- the offer which the President and Prime Minister of our countries made: that if there is an agreement here in Geneva in good time that tests will be banned and a reasonable system of verification adopted, then we are willing to stop tests now and to stop them for ever. So I make one more appeal to Mr. Gromyko to help us in this matter which is so vital to everybody in the world.

Mr. FAWZI (United Arab Republic): The two reports which this Committee has received today are, as may be seen, one on success on relative trivialities and foregone conclusions in regard to procedure, and the other from the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, which expresses the Sub-Committee's regrets that it is not possible to report progress towards such a treaty. The contrast between these two reports is obviously painful in the extreme. I want to go on record on behalf of my Government as expressing deep and painful disappointment and the earnest hope that we shall soon receive a report of success in the reaching of an agreement to discontinue these tests.

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

For our part we in the Government of the United Arab Republic are ready to contribute our modest best towards making such an agreement possible and shall, with this in view, make a new and most careful study of this situation as it has recently developed, in the light especially of the important statements we have just heard today from Mr. Rusk, Mr. Gromyko and Lord Home. We trust that in the meantime the four Governments which are principally and directly involved in this vital matter will come more into line with the feelings and convictions in this regard of all the peoples of the world and that they will actually, if not yet contractually, withhold any further nuclear weapon tests in order, among other things, to afford a better and wider scope for agreement than seems at the present moment to be available.

Mr. de SAN THIAGO DANTAS (Brazil) (translation from French): I take the floor to express to each of our eminent colleagues, and especially to those who represent the States forming the Sub-Committee, the anxiety and disappointment felt by my Government concerning the document, in the form of an interim report, informing us of the results of the Sub-Committee's work.

First of all, we are disappointed because, after ten days' work here at the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, we have the impression that not only have we made no progress, but the problem has come back to a stage which may be regarded as less promising and less advanced than the previous one.

We also feel very anxious because we are convinced that any failure in this Committee's work may constitute a threat to the world and to the future of peace which we shall have great difficulty in averting.

We refuse to accept such a solution as final or even provisional. We believe it is our duty to continue to study this problem, all the more so since the results arrived at by the three great Powers cannot be considered sufficient justification for ceasing our efforts and investigations. Our opinion, which has been very clearly stated since the beginning of the Committee's deliberations, is that in dealing with the disarmament problem it is essential for us to get away from every kind of impasse created by positions adopted for polemical purposes.

It is obvious that disarmament and the discontinuance of nuclear tests call for confidence. Now confidence is something which cannot be imposed. Any idea

(Mr. de San Thiago Dantas, Brazil)

of disarmament on trust would be unacceptable. The discontinuance of nuclear tests and every other aspect of disarmament require that each State be afforded absolute certainty that its security will not be endangered and that it will have means of verifying whether the agreements concluded are really being fulfilled.

It is obvious that all inspection depends, in the first place, on very accurate knowledge of the technical means available for verifying the implementation of the clauses of a treaty. An exchange of scientific information is essential, in order that States may have the same stock of knowledge and technical means for verifying the implementation of the agreements concluded. At the same time, it is clear that means of inspection must be provided, insofar as our common need requires.

The idea of disarmament without inspection is just as unfeasible as the idea of inspection without disarmament is unacceptable. These two extremes are closely related. The right of verification is the counterpart of disarmament and, just as we must reject any type of verification not closely connected with disarmament, we must also reject the idea of a disarmament that is promised, agreed or declared without the corresponding means of verification. In order to achieve a balance between these two extremes work is obviously needed -- work carried out in all good faith, and to which we are sure the nations assembled here in this Committee have a contribution of good will to make.

It is often difficult for the great Powers to abandon a position during a debate, because they would have to go back to it later. But the nations which wish to help on the work can very well play a part in bringing together those which possess nuclear armaments, and which will have the last word on this subject.

When the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union decided to propose to the United Nations General Assembly that a committee such as this, with this composition and this number of members should be set up, it was clearly not merely in order to have witnesses to their efforts. The efforts made by those two great Powers and by the United Kingdom are of very great value; we have the greatest respect for the methods and attitudes adopted by those countries, and for the good will they have shown in their attempts to achieve

(Mr. de San Thiago Dantas, Brazil)

progress on the problem before us. But we all believe that the other States assembled here can make a contribution -- characterized, as I have said, by good will -- towards reconciling the positions and eliminating the points in dispute.

We cannot believe that the great Powers are not resolved to eliminate this danger, which is increasing every day and threatens the human race with total destruction. We think it would be very unwise to consider that our work has come to a stop. We should regard this interim report as a mere interruption of our work, which should be continued immediately.

I think we could perhaps examine, this very day, the records circulated with the report (ENDC/SC.1/PV.1, 2), which we have not yet had time to read; they will familiarize us with the various phases of the discussions in the Sub-Committee.

Perhaps a broader discussion in a co-operative and conciliatory spirit would lead us to what we all seem to desire, namely, that the work should continue, and that we should persevere in our efforts to succeed in producing results in keeping with the intentions which prompted the United Nations to set up this Committee.

Mr. GREEN (Canada): I hesitate to participate in this intense discussion this morning, and I do so merely to make two suggestions.

I think that it is a very good thing that the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom have made this morning the statements they have made, and that we realize the problem which faces us. Would it not be a good idea if the co-Chairmen were to agree that this afternoon we give further consideration to this particular subject in informal session? We all realize how very difficult it is and how tense feelings are on this question, and I am confident that it would be of considerable help if we were to have an informal talk this afternoon. The informal meetings we have had earlier in the week have all been very beneficial. The informal meetings are a good deal more intimate than the discussions which take place in plenary meetings; there is not the same need to make speeches, there is opportunity for question and answer, and I would hope that my fellow representatives would agree with me that a meeting this afternoon would be worth while. The issue before us is so vital that we do not want to waste time. Time, after all, is precious. Some of us are going to be in Geneva for only another few days, and I think we should spend as much time as we can in discussing these particular questions.

(Mr. Green, Canada)

The other suggestion I would like to make is that it would be worth while if the representatives of the three nuclear Powers were to invite to the informal talk I have just suggested representatives of the eight non-aligned nations. Perhaps two or more could be selected, or all the eight be invited. I do not know which would be the best way of handling it but I am sure that some new ideas would be brought forward by the representatives of the eight -- and obviously new ideas are needed. The three nuclear Powers have held between 300 and 400 meetings. I do not think there is any doubt that at a good many of those meetings they have not had new ideas, and if they could not bring out all their thoughts during that number of meetings they are not likely to get very many new thoughts now. In any event, I think it would be very helpful to have representatives who are facing this problem for the first time called in for very informal talks.

I make those two suggestions to the Committee.

I do not agree with Mr. Gromyko when he says that the work of the Committee has not been very encouraging. That is a terrible statement to come from one of the co-Chairmen, because if the work has not been encouraging that is the fault of himself and his other co-Chairman. I think we have been getting along pretty well. The atmosphere at this Conference is excellent -- I must admit it is a great deal better than I had expected it to be -- and we have reached agreement on quite a few matters. These may have been of only a procedural character but nevertheless they are of a good deal of importance. The attitude of the two co-Chairmen also has been excellent, they have worked together very well -- which has not been easy for them -- and I do not think we should be discouraged. We are making progress, and I think that, if we continue as we have been doing, we shall achieve at this Conference some results which will be of great value to the entire world.

Mr. YIFRU (Ethiopia): This issue is so important that I do not think we can afford not to devote all our time to it. What Mr. Green has just said is, I think, also very important. I feel that we should have more opportunity to discuss openly and frankly, and that informal meetings such as we have been having so far will be very helpful. I support very strongly the suggestion that we should meet informally this afternoon and review this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I have to announce that the co-Chairmen have agreed that we should have an informal meeting this afternoon at 4 o'clock. The suggestion made by the Foreign Minister of Canada, supported by the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, has therefore been very well supported indeed.

I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to document ENDC/12, setting forth the procedure of work of the Conference as recommended by the co-Chairmen, which has just been distributed. Are there any comments?

Mr. RUSK (United States of America): I might just make a brief comment for the record in connexion with this paper, which we have accepted. We have accepted the deletion of specific reference to the possibility of establishing sub-committees of the plenary Conference or of the Committee of the Whole, although we would have preferred the inclusion of such reference. Based on the extensive discussion at yesterday's informal meeting, and on further discussions with the co-Chairmen, we are satisfied that the possibility of establishing sub-committees is open for future consideration. The United States believes that such sub-committees will probably be indispensable at some time to the advancement of the work of the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): If there are no other comments, I shall regard this document as approved.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. Wachuku, Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Nigeria.

"A statement was made by the representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made on the interim report of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests by the representatives of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Republic, Brazil, Canada and Ethiopia.

"The Conference adopted proposals recommended by the co-Chairmen on the procedure of work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and a statement was made by the representative of the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 26 March 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.